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Hard, Harder, and the Hardest Problem: The 
Society of Cognitive Selves 
Venkata Rayudu Posina* 
Abstract 
The hard problem of consciousness is explicating how 
moving matter becomes thinking matter. Harder yet is the 
problem of spelling out the mutual determinations of 
individual experiences and the experiencing self. 
Determining how the collective social consciousness 
influences and is influenced by the individual selves 
constituting the society is the hardest problem. Drawing 
parallels between individual cognition and the collective 
knowing of mathematical science, here we present a 
conceptualization of the cognitive dimension of the self. 
Our abstraction of the relations between the physical 
world, biological brain, mind, intuition, consciousness, 
cognitive self, and the society can facilitate the 
construction of the conceptual repertoire required for an 
explicit science of the self within human society. 
Keywords: Category Theory, Consciousness and Mind, Monad Self 
1. Introduction 
The nature of the experiential self is a highly debated topic in 
philosophy.  Various schools of thought have been arguing that 
there is no self.  These arguments against the reality of the self are 
usually based on analogies such as ‘row of ants’ (Siderits, 
Thompson, & Zahavi, 2011, pp. 1-26) and ‘center of gravity’ 
(Dennett, 1992). Countering these analogy-based 
mischaracterizations of the self as an illusion, fiction, or myth (cf. 
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Metzinger, 2009), Menon (2014) argued for recognizing the self, 
which is given in subjective experiences, as the experiencer (see 
also Midgley, 2014).  Here we bring out the conceptual necessity of 
the self by way of extending the recent idealization of ordinary 
cognition as mathematical knowing (Posina, Ghista, and Roy, 
2017), which is based on Lawvere’s (1994a) ‘Categorical Refinement 
of a Hegelian Principle’ (see also Lawvere, 2013a).  The basis of our 
arguments is the representational character of conscious 
experiences (Chalmers, 2006).  Simply stated, conscious experiences 
are representations of some state-of-affairs of the world, and thanks 
to these subjective experiences the experiencing subject gets to 
know about the world.  Upon realizing that we have a definite 
understanding of the notion of ‘representation’ within the collective 
mathematical practices of representing reality (Lawvere, 1963; 
Lawvere, 1994a; Lawvere, 2004; Lawvere, 2013b), the author 
examined mathematical experience to discern the implications of 
the representational character of subjective experiences.  With 
conscious experiences as subjective representations of objective 
things, we find that, going by the mathematical experience, there 
must be analogues of measured properties, abstract theories, 
backgrounds (for interpreting theories to obtain representations), 
and mathematical doctrines, which make subjective experiences 
representations of one or another thing.  Upon comparing neural 
coding to measurement of properties, mental concepts to abstract 
theories, intuition to background, and the self to a doctrine, which 
determines how a given state-of-affairs is represented, we 
characterize the decisive abstract general relations between the 
material world, biological brain, mind, intuition, consciousness, 
and the self within human society. 
One could begin with Hume, who pointed out that, when one looks 
into oneself, one finds subjective experiences such as the sight of a 
sunset, or the sound of a bell, or the smell of a rose; and that is all 
there is (Hume, 1978).  More than anything else, what Hume’s 
experience tells us is that the method that detects subjective 
experiences does not detect the subject.  Based on this observation 
we can conclude that subjective experiences and the experiencing 
subject are two different kinds of entities.  Introspective exercises 
such as these, nevertheless, led many to conclude that there is no 
self or that the self is at most a bundle of subjective experiences.  
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Even within this bundle theory of self, self is an entity 
distinguishable from subjective experiences by virtue of its distinct 
structure and properties vis-à-vis those of subjective experiences.  
More specifically, the self as a bundle [of subjective experiences] 
has the property of size (e.g. big bundle, small bundle), which 
subjective experiences themselves do not have.  In more formal 
terms, a set [of elements] is a distinct structure distinguishable from 
the elements that the set contains (Lawvere, 1994b; Lawvere & 
Rosebrugh 2003, p. 1).  To deny the existence of the self [on the 
grounds that it is no more than a bundle of subjective experiences] 
is, from this perspective, as sensible as denying the existence of sets 
[as distinct from the elements that they contain].  A related 
argument against enduring selves is based on the idea that there is 
no subject without subjective experiences (Strawson, 2009).  With 
subjective experiences as elements and the self as a set formed of 
the subjective experiences, we find that there can be a self without 
subjective experiences.  If we remove all the elements from any set, 
then what we have is a set—an empty set—and not a situation of 
‘no set’.  In other words, with the self as a totality of subjective 
experiences (irrespective of how one formalizes totality), selves 
exist with or without subjective experiences, which highlights the 
inconceivability of the claim: “no experience, no subject” (Gallagher 
2011, p. 9). The reality of the self, as the subject given in subjective 
experiences, can be made more palpable by noting the conceptual 
kinship between conscious experience and description, as follows. 
Consider a commonplace experience: seeing a cursor blinking on a 
computer screen.  Where is the self in this conscious experience of 
seeing a blinking cursor?  Is the self an artifact of articulation 
brought into being when describing one’s experiences as in: “I see a 
blinking cursor”?  More pointedly, is there anything to this ‘I’ 
above and beyond the sights and sounds to which it is prefixed (cf. 
I see..., I hear...)?  Yes, the self is intrinsic to and yet distinct from 
conscious experience, which can be readily seen by comparing 
conscious experiences to descriptions. A sentence such as ‘Rama 
killed Ravana’ readily signifies an event of which it is a description.  
Though not as readily, it also exemplifies the grammar, i.e., subject-
verb-object structure underlying that particular description.  Along 
similar lines, an equation: ‘y = x’ readily signifies a straight line; 
and that signification is made possible by Cartesian geometry 
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(Lawvere & Schanuel, 2009, pp. 41-42).  These illustrations indicate 
that the processes involved in describing are not as readily 
discernible [as that which is described] in the descriptions.  But, 
that is no license to deny either the grammar of verbal descriptions 
or the mathematics of mathematical modeling.  So is the case with 
the self of subjective experiences.  Just as grammar determines 
what can be said and what must be said in describing any given 
state-of-affairs, and just as mathematics determines how to model 
any given situation, so does the self: one’s self determines how one 
experiences.  Encouraged by these preliminary clarifications, we 
embarked on a thorough investigation of the parallels between 
mathematics and cognition. 
Mathematics is about knowing and so is the self (Menon, 2014, p. 
1).  In drawing parallels between individual cognition and 
collective mathematical knowing, we realized the indispensability 
of the notion of self (as discussed in the section titled ‘The Knowing 
Self’).  Our immediate objective here is to clarify various notions of 
the consciousness studies in terms of better-understood constructs 
drawn from the domain of mathematics.  The present paper 
documents the feasibility and fruitfulness of this research program 
by way of identifying analogues of the self, consciousness, mind, 
brain, and the world within the practice of mathematical knowing.  
The mathematical analogues, in turn, suggest a formalization of the 
relations between the material world of things, their neural coding 
in the brain, mental concepts, conscious experiences, and the 
experiencing subject.  Before we present our mathematical 
framework, we provide a brief account of the rationale behind our 
approach to the development of an explicit science of the self. 
2. On the Development of the Science of the Self 
How does one develop the science of the self?  In broad terms, 
science is the alignment of reason with experience.  Advancement 
of the science involves, additionally, the development of novel 
concepts that fit reality (given in planned perception or 
experimental findings).  In reasoning about a given experience, 
oftentimes, the inadequacy of available concepts becomes clear, 
which fuels the search for simpler instances (exemplifying the 
essence of given experience), where abstraction of appropriate 
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general concepts is relatively easy.  Thus developed conceptual 
repertoire can then be brought to bear on comprehending the 
original motivating experiences.  As an illustration, consider the 
study of motion.  Motion, as is the case with any other experience, 
did not come equipped with the science of motion.  And, of course, 
watching and wondering about the many ways things move: 
swimming fish, sprinting athletes, slithering snakes, shooting stars, 
sailing ships, racing thoughts, gushing winds, flying birds, flowing 
rivers, falling coconuts, drifting clouds, changing seasons, buzzing 
bees, beating hearts, etc. did not result in Newton’s universal laws 
of motion.  A key step in the development of the science of motion 
is Galileo’s study of the motion of a falling stone, which might have 
seemed too simplistic to inform our understanding of the more 
fascinating, say, flight of the birds (Lawvere & Schanuel, 2009, pp. 
3-9, 308-309). However, it is this skeletal motion of dropped objects 
falling straight to the ground (and not plucking one feather after 
another of a bird to see its effect on the flight of the bird) that gave 
us the foundational concept of acceleration (to name one), which 
formed the basis for the subsequent development of more 
complicated concepts such as torque needed to provide a 
satisfactory scientific account of the bird flight, not to mention the 
applications of the science of motion leading all the way up to 
orbiting satellites, among other fantastical moving things. 
Drawing parallels to the development of the science of motion, as 
in the case of motion, there are also many selves: spiritual self, 
social self, physical self, narrative self, mental self, experiential self, 
emotional self, embodied self, ecological self, conceptual self, and 
cognitive self, just to name a few (Gallagher, 2000).  Paralleling the 
puzzlement over the very possibility of motion (cf. Zeno’s 
paradox), we also have strange arguments against the very 
existence of the self (see ‘Introduction’), all of which is reminiscent 
of a pre-Galilean state-of-affairs.  Having recognized that the study 
of the self is in a pre-Galilean state, as a first step towards the 
development of the science of the self, we identified ‘cognitive self’ 
as the “falling body” of the science of the self in the sense 
‘knowing’ exemplifies the essence of the self (see the section titled 
‘The Knowing Self’). 
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The study of the self, not unlike the study of motion that 
necessarily involves space and time, is necessarily a study of the 
triangular relationship between objective reality, subjective 
experiences, and the experiencing subject.  With knowing as an 
integral part of experiencing, we look for a model system to study 
the mutual relations between objects, subjective knowledge 
(resulting from thinking and seeing), and the knowing self.  In 
particular, we would like to thoroughly characterize the 
determination of subjective experiences by both the subject and the 
object.  Informally speaking, we are seeking a science of viewpoint, 
which determines how things appear.  Upon focusing on 
individual cognition, we find that the notion of mathematical 
doctrine (also known as monad), which determines the 
generalization (theory and model) involved in knowing about a 
particular category of mathematical objects (Lawvere,1994a, 
Lawvere, 2004; Lawvere, 2013b), serves as an elementary form of 
the knowing self (determining the conception and perception of 
given stimuli).  The functorial calculus of generalization (with 
respect to a doctrine) of the given particulars can facilitate the 
development of the science of the knowing self the way calculus 
facilitated the development of physics (Lawvere, 1999, p. 412).  In 
the following, we motivate our conceptualization of the knowing 
self by elaborating on the added difficulty of accounting for the 
self, beyond that of mind and conscious experiences (Menon, 2014). 
3. The Harder Problem 
There are things in the world and we, the thinkers, think about 
things.  Things are made up of matter and so are thinkers.  Within 
this materialist world-picture, there are two kinds of things: (i) 
moving things and (ii) thinking things (Lawvere, 1980).  What is 
not clear, in our scientific world-view, is how thinking things 
emerge from moving things.  This is the largely acknowledged 
‘hard problem’ of consciousness studies (Chalmers, 1995).  Though 
not as widely acknowledged, the problem of transforming 
experiences into experiencing self is harder than the hard problem 
of transforming things into experience of things (Menon, 2014, pp. 
2, 34, 50-60).  The added difficulty is the inconceivability of 
‘perspective’ emerging from observations.  Perspective is a 
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precondition for observing; observations are invariably from here, 
there, or somewhere (Campos & Gutiérrez, 2015; Sen, 1993).  
Consider, for example, a cylinder standing on its base.  The 
appearance of the cylinder depends on the viewpoint from which it 
is viewed.  The cylinder appears as a circle, when viewed from top, 
and it appears as a rectangle when viewed from front.  Note that it 
is the viewpoint ‘top’ that makes the circle an appearance of the 
cylinder.  Appearance [of a thing] is an appearance [of the thing] 
from a perspective.  The notion of ‘perspective’ cannot be reduced 
to observations; it is a conceptual prior that makes observation 
possible, which is along the lines of Kantian resolution of the 
conflicting—Descartes vs. Hume—claims regarding the reality of 
the self (Hamilton, 2015; Praetorius, 2016).  Put differently, 
conscious experiences are about something; they represent some 
state-of-affairs (Chalmers, 2006).  Conscious experiences, not unlike 
representations, are representative of that which they represent, but 
only from a certain perspective.  A subjective experience that 
represents a certain state-of-affairs is representative of that state-of-
affairs only for the subject to whom the subjective experience 
belongs to.  This is a simple consequence of the representational 
character of experience.  For example, computer signifies a thing to 
me, but to someone who does not know English, the word 
“computer” is merely black contours on a white background.  In 
other words, descriptions are descriptions of that which they 
describe, but only from a specific perspective (which in this case is 
a particular language).  Upon admitting conscious experience, into 
reality, as an experience about one or another thing, as a reflective 
part of reality, we readily recognize conscious experience as an 
experience of a subject, which, in turn, forces us to admit the 
experiencing self, as a viewpoint making appearance possible, also 
into our conception of reality.  This conception of reality consists of 
not only objects and observations (subjective appearances of 
objective things), but also observers (viewpoints).  Reality, for the 
most part, has been analyzed in terms of two categories: Being 
(objectifying ‘unity’ as the category of reflexive graphs) and 
Becoming (objectifying ‘change’ as the category of dynamical 
systems; Lawvere, 1991; Lawvere, 1992; Lawvere, 1999).  In other 
words, we attribute reality to things and their transformations.  
However, reality also consists of a special type of things such as 
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books, theories, and brains that are reflective of the reality 
(Lawvere & Schanuel, 2009, pp. 84-85; see also Sen, 1993).  More 
importantly, reality includes perspectives, which personify the 
possibility of reflection i.e. the appearances of things.  This notion 
of perspective, just like the self, cannot be reduced to objective 
things or subjective appearances (see Campos & Gutiérrez, 2015).  
However, the relationship between subjective experiences, 
experiencing subjects, and objects of experience can be 
systematically investigated, as discussed below, in terms of the 
analogous situation of mathematical knowing involving 
generalization (theories and models) of objective particulars based 
on a doctrine. 
Our subjective experiences (mental concepts, conscious percepts) 
are reflective of the objective reality.  Based on these subjective 
reflections we make our way through the world.  When viewed 
from the perspective of reflecting, the functorial calculus of 
mathematical knowing involving particulars, properties, theories, 
models, presentations, and doctrines provides a coherent 
framework to unify all six categories of consciousness studies: 1. 
Physics (stimuli), 2. Biology (neural codes), 3. Mind (concepts), 4. 
Consciousness (percept), 5. Language (descriptions), and 6. Self 
(locus of coding, thinking, seeing, and speaking).  Our plan is to 
objectify the concept of REFLECTING as a Category of Reflecting 
(along the lines of the objectification of Being and Becoming as 
categories of reflexive graphs and dynamical systems, 
respectively).  More specifically, since theories are reflective 
subcategories defined in terms of adjoint functors, the act of 
reflecting can be objectified as a category with monads of theory-
model adjoint functors as objects. 
4. The Knowing Self 
Self, according to the Indian philosophical text Bhagavad Gītā, is the 
knower (Menon, 2014, p. 1).  Self is not merely the subject of one’s 
subjective experiences; it is the knowing subject, which is self-
aware.  With ‘self as self-aware knower’, the self is required to 
include not only knowledge but also a declarative understanding of 
the procedural knowledge of acquiring knowledge.  The self—
conceptualized as a reflexive knower—is thus the higher-order 
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knowledge of both knowing and knowledge.  Given the 
definiteness of scientific knowledge, modeling ‘self as scientist’ can 
be a fruitful exercise leading to added insights into the nature of the 
self.  Unfortunately, there is no scientific account, within science, of 
a scientist.  Thankfully, within mathematical sciences, we have the 
mathematics of category theory, which not only accounts for 
mathematical knowledge but also for the processes of acquiring 
mathematical knowledge.  Development of the science of knowing, 
according to F. William Lawvere, ‘will require the use of the 
mathematical theory of categories.  Even within mathematical 
experience, only that theory has approximated a particular model 
of the general, sufficient as a foundation for a general account of all 
particulars’ (Lawvere, 1994a, p. 43).  Thus, with regard to the 
reflexive-knowing attribute of the self, mathematics in general and, 
more specifically, the category of categories (Lawvere, 1966) 
constitutes a good model system to investigate self-awareness. A 
self-aware system is, minimally, one with a representation of itself 
within itself, i.e., there is a part within a whole which is reflective of 
the whole (or other parts of the whole).The category of categories is 
autonomous i.e. every category contains a discrete subcategory 
which is reflective of the category in the sense objects of a category 
can be represented within itself i.e. as diagrams in the discrete 
subcategory (Lawvere, 2004, pp. 11-12).  Of course, the knowledge 
constituting the self is much more elaborate than mathematical 
knowledge.  In fact, our arguments for the reality of the self are 
based on recognizing mathematical knowing as a special case of the 
more general individual cognition (Lawvere,1994a), and as an 
empirical phenomenon (Hersh, 2017).  Careful examination of the 
mathematical knowing suggests a framework for organizing the 
categories of the material world, brain, mind, consciousness, and 
the self without reducing everything into matter, or equating 
consciousness with mind (as in Western philosophical traditions; 
Rao, 1998), or calling it an illusion, which is “the silliest view ever 
held in the history of human thought” (Strawson, 2018). 
Knowing-within-mathematics involves abstracting concepts based 
on the measured properties of given mathematical objects, and 
interpreting the abstract theory to obtain concrete models 
(Lawvere, 1994a; Lawvere & Rosebrugh 2003, pp. 154-155; Lawvere 
& Schanuel 2009, pp. 135-136).  For example, given a category of 
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mathematical objects such as graphs, we measure their properties, 
say, dots and arrows.  Comparing the measured properties of 
graphs gives rise to a theory of graphs (consisting of two graphs: 
dot and arrow, along with two graph morphisms specifying the 
inclusion of the dot into the arrow as source, target dot).  In the 
light of this graph theory, a graph is modeled as a parallel pair of 
functions assigning to each arrow in the common domain set of 
arrows its source, target dot in the common codomain set of dots 
(Lawvere, 1994a, pp. 46-47; Lawvere & Schanuel, 2009, pp. 149-151; 
Posina, Ghista & Roy, 2017).  Broadly speaking, mathematical 
generalization (theorizing and modeling) of a given category of 
particulars is determined by the choice of a mathematical doctrine 
(universal properties such as product; Lawvere, 1969; Lawvere, 
2004, pp. 9-11).  Abstract theories are calculated with respect to a 
doctrine; concrete models preserve the structure specified by the 
doctrine (Lawvere, 1994a; Lawvere, 2013b; Picado, 2007, pp. 14-15).  
Moreover, the processes of abstraction (to obtain theories) and 
interpretation (to obtain models) are adjoint functors (Lawvere, 
2006).  This pair of adjoint functors can be obtained as a “splitting” 
of a doctrine (or monad; also known as triple in Eilenberg & Moore, 
1965).  Thus, the choice of a doctrine determines the way 
particulars (mathematical objects) are generalized (theorized and 
modeled).  Subjective generals (theories and models) are about the 
given objective particulars (just as subjective appearances are 
appearances of the given objects), with the chosen mathematical 
doctrine serving as a subjective viewpoint determining how objects 
appear when viewed from that point of view. 
Within the representational framework, conscious experience of a 
thing is a representation or a model of the thing (Chalmers, 2006).  
Based on the mathematical experience, a model of a thing is an 
appearance of the thing as seen in the light of a theory; so a model 
of an object depends not only on the object but also on the theory 
used to model.  Comparing mental concepts to theories, we expect 
conscious experience (model) of a given stimulus to depend on 
mental concepts (theory).  Consistent with this, mental concepts do 
determine the interpretation (conscious perception) of physical 
stimuli.  What one sees, when one looks at any given image, 
depends on the mental concepts used to interpret the image.  When 
looking at, say, R. C. James’s image, one initially sees black and 
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white blobs of various sizes and shapes.  As soon as one brings the 
concept DALMATIAN to bear on the image, the same image is 
perceptually interpreted as a dog (Miller, 1999).  In other words, 
our subjective experiences [of a situation] are models [of the 
situation] in the light of a theory (mental concept).  Further 
examination of the mathematical experience shows that a 
mathematical theory of a category of mathematical objects depends 
not only on the objects but also on a mathematical doctrine, which 
can be thought of as a viewpoint.  Changing the doctrine changes 
the way things are conceptualized and modeled (Lawvere, 1994a).  
In this context it may be noted that ‘the doctrine can be varied, or 
“screwed up or down” as James Clerk Maxwell put it, in order to 
see various phenomena’ (Lawvere, 2001).  In light of this analogy of 
collective mathematical knowing, we suggest that the self, like a 
mathematical doctrine or monad (Lawvere, 2013b), determines all 
the thinking (mind / totality of theories) and experiencing 
(consciousness / totality of models) involved in individual 
knowing (Posina, Ghista & Roy, 2017).  Note that measured 
properties, abstract theories, and concrete models are all about 
mathematical objects, albeit from the perspective of a mathematical 
doctrine (monad).  Along similar lines, neural coding in the brain, 
concepts in the mind, and conscious experiences are all about 
objective things, albeit from the perspective of an experiencing 
subject.  In comparing mathematical objects, measured properties, 
abstract theories, concrete models, and the mathematical doctrine 
(constituting the collective knowing of mathematics) with physical 
stimuli, neural codes, mental concepts, conscious percepts, and the 
self (constituting the individual knowing of an experiencing 
subject), respectively, we find that the self can be thought of as a 
doctrine (or monad) within which all the mental conception and 
conscious perception takes place via neural measures of the 
properties of given physical stimuli.  Simply put, there is more to 
the subjective appearance (model) of a particular object than all that 
is given in the object; we traced the “more” that is in the subjective 
appearance to the subject (doctrine).  In this framework, the 
material world is conceptualized as a totality of all possible 
categories of objects (or a category of categories; Lawvere, 1966), 
while the brain is conceptualized as a totality of measured 
properties (or a category of functors; Lawvere & Schanuel, 2009, 
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pp. 369-370).  With properties as functors and concepts as relations 
between properties (or natural transformations), mind, the totality 
of concepts or theories, is a “higher-dimensional” object compared 
to the brain.  With percept as an interpretation (or a functor from 
the category objectifying a concept) into a background intuition, 
consciousness, the totality of perceptual experiences, is a further 
higher-dimensional object (Posina, Ghista & Roy, 2017).  In light of 
the conceptualization of the knowing self as a doctrine (monad), 
and in view of a doctrine splitting into the adjoint functors of 
abstraction and interpretation constituting mathematical knowing 
(as alluded to earlier), mind (totality of thinking) and consciousness 
(totality of experiencing; Koch, 2018) constituting knowing can be 
thought of as a “splitting” of the self.  Stated differently, the 
knowing self (doctrine/monad) is the basic construct underlying 
the mental conception and conscious perception (generalization) of 
objective things (particulars). 
5. The Hardest Problem: The Society of Cognitive Selves 
The biological aspect of a society can be modeled as a set S 
equipped with two functions, mother, father: S → S, assigning to 
each individual in the society its parents, who are also individuals 
in the society S (Lawvere, 1999).  Cultural aspects such as clan, 
marriage, and inheritance customs can be modeled by way of 
enriching the biological structure with clan and gender as labeling 
sets (Lawvere & Schanuel, 2009, pp.  162-163). Here, we model the 
cognitive dimension of a society or the society of cognitive selves as 
a category of monads, with each monad as a cognitive self [in a 
cognitive society] determining how it experiences (thinks and 
perceives) the world.  A cognitive self in a society, by virtue of 
being an object of a category, is completely determined by its 
relations to all cognitive selves in the society (cf. Yoneda lemma; 
Lawvere & Rosebrugh, 2003, p. 249; for a detailed exposition of 
Yoneda lemma see Appendix A1 in Posina & Roy, 2018).  Thus, our 
model captures the relational nature of the self within society, as 
expressed by the Swahili word, ubuntu, which means, in the words 
of Desmond Tutu, “You are human precisely owing to 
relationships: you are a relational being” (Humphrey, 2007, p. 754).  
Human Society is, in the words of St. Augustine, “a region of 
Venkata Rayudu Posina                  Hard, Harder, and the Hardest Problem 
87 
 
unlikeness”, a symbolic space wherein everything is experienced as 
something (Posina, 2017). 
What is the nature of the totality of cognitive selves?  One, possibly 
very naïve, answer would be: the totality of cognitive selves form a 
society (or at least the cognitive dimension of society).  With 
cognitive selves as monads, society—the totality of cognitive 
selves—is the category of monads; more specifically, the category 
of composites of structure-semantics adjoint functors.  What is the 
essence in which every cognitive self in the society (of Homo 
sapiens) partakes by virtue of being an object of the category of 
structure-semantics monads?  Every cognitive self (object) of the 
(category of structure-semantics mondas i.e.) human society, 
perceives a particular as an exemplar of a general.  A thorough 
characterization of the nature of human society, when modeled as 
the category of structure-semantics monads, requires a deeper 
study of the category, which is beyond the scope of the present 
paper, which, in turn, is to introduce the categorical method to 
cognitive and social scientists. 
6. Conclusion 
In the beginning, according to the eminently sensible scientific 
world-view, there was matter. Upon fast-forwarding to the present, 
we find, in addition to the world of material things, brains 
measuring these things, minds conceptualizing these measured 
things, and conscious experiences resulting from interpretations of 
these mental concepts, the experiencing subjects as the loci of all 
this thinking, seeing, and knowing.  It is natural, given this 
temporal ordering with matter predating mind, consciousness, and 
the self, to wonder how mind or consciousness emerged from 
matter.  Unfortunately, to put in the words of Fodor: “Nobody has 
the slightest idea how anything material could be conscious.  
Nobody even knows what it would be like to have the slightest 
idea about how anything material could be conscious” (Fodor, 
1992, p. 5).  Reminiscent of treating ‘absence of evidence’ as 
‘evidence of absence’, many resorted to explaining away this 
scientific shortcoming of the materialist worldview by labeling 
conscious experiences and the experiencing self as illusions 
(Dennett, 1992; Metzinger, 2009; see also Strawson, 2018).  Here we 
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put forward mathematics as a thinking-device to help appreciate 
the reality of the self.  The representational character of subjective 
experiences provides an immediate impetus for drawing parallels 
to mathematics.  In comparing measured properties, abstract 
theories, background, concrete models, and doctrines (of 
mathematical knowing) to neural coding, mental concepts, 
intuition, conscious percepts, and experiencing subjects (of 
ordinary cognition), respectively, we find that the self is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of thinking and perceiving 
involved in experiencing in general and knowing in particular.  
Further investigations of the functional dependence of subjective 
generals (theories and models) on both objective particulars and the 
mathematical doctrine (monad) can help refine our understanding 
of the functional dependence of subjective experiences on both 
objective things and the knowing self. 
Our functorial semantics of cognition framework (Lawvere, 1994a; 
Lawvere, 2004), enables the solution of mathematical problems 
analogous to a number of fundamental questions in consciousness 
studies.  For example: 
1. Formally, what are the conditions under which ‘C(R1) is 
isomorphic to C(R2)’ implies ‘R1 is isomorphic to R2’, where R1 
and R2 are elements of reality, while C(R1) and C(R2) are the 
corresponding conscious experiences, respectively. 
2. Given that the theories of objects R1, R2 (of the category R 
objectifying reality) are T(R1), T(R2), respectively, does T(R1 + R2) 
= T(R1) + T(R2)?  Expressing in words, is the theory of a sum of 
objects same as the sum of the theories of the objects?  Is the process 
of theorizing (mental conception) respectful of the putting together 
of objects of reality (cf. DOG + CAT = ANIMAL). 
3. Given that the models of objects R1 and R2 (of reality R) are 
M(R1) and M(R2), respectively, does M(R1 × R2) = M(R1) × M(R2)?  
In words, is the model of a product of objects same as the product 
of the models of the objects?  For instance, in case of the category of 
graphs, the functor modeling graphs as parallel pairs of functions 
preserves the product operation (Lawvere & Schanuel, 2009, pp. 
141, 150, 258-260).  Here we are asking a more general question: is 
the process of modeling (conscious perception) respectful of the 
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many ways of putting together objects (cf. RED × SQUARE = RED 
SQUARE). 
4. In a similar vein, what is the relation between products of models 
and sums of theories in context of the familiar exponential law, i.e. 
is BT × BV = B(T+V), where T and V are theories (mental concepts), 
while B is background category (cf. intuition) for [categories of] 
models (conscious percepts) BT, BV, and B(T+V)?  Answers to these 
mathematical questions can inform the grand philosophical 
problem of the comprehensibility of reality (Einstein, 1936), 
especially given our finite windows (concepts, percepts) on the 
world. 
Summing it all, we identified representation as the basic notion of 
cognitive sciences.  We then applied the mathematics of 
representation—functorial semantics—to model the society of 
cognitive selves.  We hope our idealization of 
Physical reality – Biological Brain – Mind – Intuition – 
Consciousness – Self – Society  
As 
Particulars – Properties – Theories – Background – Models – 
Monad – Category of Monads 
will inspire cognitive and social scientists to bring functorial 
semantics in particular and category theory in general to bear on 
cognitive and social sciences. 
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